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One or the most prominent characteristics of the
modern business world is',,the fierce competition which
exists in all branches of trade.

If the old maxim which

has been so often quoted, that competition is t:,ie life
of trade, were strictly true and applied with full force
to the present situation, it m]ight be reasonable to suppose that those business

enterprises which are now sub-

ject to the sharpest rivalry would enjoy the greatest
prosperity.

But judging from the complaints which are

uttered concerning the evils of unrestricted competition,
and the efforts which are made to avoid its effects, it
seems safe to assert that the contrary is the result,
and that there may be too much of this life giving elemant.

The tendency of late seems to have been towards

an unlimited expansion in all lilies of business.

Fac-

tories and shops have been built, and goods have bean
produced by them, with little apparent regard to the demand which must regulate the price for which they will
be sold.

These goods, once map.e, must be disposed of in

order that the money used in their proatction may be

2
re-employed in paying running expenses and indebtedness.
As a result prices would be measurea not by the value
of the goods,

but by the necessities of the owners.

Few concerns

could afford to carry their stock until

paying prices could be obtained, but would be compelled
to sell out for whatever sum could be gotten.

As a re-

sult, the over production of the goods and the financial
weakness of their ownersforced down the prices of many
stable articles until

they became so low that little or

no profits were to be earned by their manufacture.
Not only was this result brought about by the reckless
manner in which manufacturing establishments were increased in number; but also by the increased facilities
for transportation and

communication.

ly these last,

localities situated at a distance would be brought into
direct competition; and establishments whose existence
would be utterly unknown to one another in
would be business rivals in the next.
all this was

one year

The result of

a fierce straggle, not only for prof-

its, but in many cases for very existence.

The contin-

ued existence of this condition of things naturally
caused those most ai"ectly affected to seek most dil-

igently for some remedy.
vince

all

that

This search seemed to con-

there was but one thing to be done,

that was to reduce the number of competitors.

and

Such a

purpose met witi the approval, not only of business men,
but of writers on ecnomic subjects, and even in sane
cases Of the courts.

Two alternatives were offered in

accomplishing this object:
fierce

Either-Ito engage in such a

,iar of competition as to drive to

weak concerns;

the wall all

or to use more peaceful means,

and by

purchase remove a competitor from the field altoether,
or by consolidation make him an ally.

The first alter-

native possessed too many dangers to be adopted except
as a last resort.

The second was theone whichwas

adopted, and in some form or other put into effect.
This last

alternative

might be brought abo: .

removing competitors one at-

either

by

a time by contracts with

each one, or by a combination which would include all
or a majority and render their interests identical.
The first course by which one competitor might be removed
through

a contract

in which he restrained himself from

competing, has been sanctioned by many decisions.
One of the first of these seems to be

the case of

Lroad v. Jollyfe--Cro. Jac. 596--(1621) in which it
1or a valuable consider
"F'
ition, anu voluntari-

w,.s said:
ly,

one may ar-ree not

to use his

dir-ection was the decision in
ell

v.

Reynolds--1

which case,
restr'Uint

P.

Wins.

trade. "

the

11;1--

In

the same

famous case of "1itchdeciaeci

in 1711, and

on account of the aiscussion of the law of

of trade which

the judge

incorporated

into his

opinion, has been cited a vast number of times;

and very

cften as authority for decisions
in

their

case.

results

differing very much

from those ar'ived

at

The tenor of more rece,-,t case2,

and Amiei-ica,

see_,s

in

both in England

to be toward holding that the

tion in such contracts must be reasonable,
n,

this p'>rticular

th at is afford

mcive protection to the party benefited, and

greater rest,-aint upon the pa-ty restricted,
necessary to carr;

impose no

than

is

out the purpese of the contract.

This rule* as t,, ttie reasonableness
changed

restric-

and grown hroaaei

of the resti'aint

anu broader,

until

has

nuw the

restriction from competition which a man may place upon
himself when he sells out his business to another is almost

livnitless.

:omie recent

cases which discuss

and ap-

ply this r' le as to reasonableness are; Leslie v. Lor-

5
rillard--llO 1'2.Y. , 5l'-- Diamond ;atch Co. v.
106 IN. Y. , 473--

Leal v. Chase--31 >ic2.,

Roeber--

4bO-- Lorsont

v. Leather Co.--Law Rep. 15 Eq. Cases, 64.9-- 2ousillon
v. Rousillon--L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 351--.

In the first of

these, a corporation runninr a line o) stearnships from
U'ew York to

1Lorfolk,

Va. bought out a competinr line;

and a clause i, the contract restraining the owners of
the rival line from entering into any further competition, was upheld.

In the seend, a contract made by

Roeber not to engare in the match business anywhere in
the United States except in Montana and T,,evada was sustained.

In the fourth, a restriction which embraced

all Europe was discussed and held Food; and in Rousillon
v. Rousillon, ani

e,'ployee of the plaintff in co sider-

ation of his employment ar-reed not to enter into any competition with the plaintiff for -2 certain period after
leaving him, aid the agr'eement was held good.

A few

quotations frovL. these decisions may serve to shw the
attitude of the courts on the subject of competition.
Says Jure Gray in Leslie v. Lorrillard, "The tendency
of modern thought and of the decisions,

owev i , has

been no longer to upholc. in its strictness the doctrine

which formerly prevailed in respect to agreements in
restraint of' trade.
ments were

The severity 'wvith which such agrefe-

"irst treated

became more and more relaxed

by exceptions and qualifications.

This changet-: was grad-

ual and may be considered, perhaps, as due mainly to the
rgrowth anu
world,

spread of the industrial activities of the

and to enlar!'ed cotmercial facilities,

which ran-

der such agreements less dangerous as tending to create
monopolies."

In the Diamond W,1atch Co. v. Roeber Judge

Andrews said; "it

is quite obvious that some of the reas-

ons fo±' such a doctrine

are much less forcible now than

when Llitchell v. Reynolds was decided.

Steam and elec-

tricity have, for the purposes of trade and commerce,
almost annihilated distance,and the whole world is now
a mart for the distribution of the products of industry.
The great

d.iffsion of wealth and the restless activity

of mankind striving to better their condition, has greatly enlarged the field of human enterprise and created a
vast number of new industries, which give scope to ingenuity and employment for capital and labor.
ct of recent adjudica tions is

marked in

The tenden-

the direction of

relaxing the rif:or of the doctrine that all

contracts

in

general restraint of tra,.e are void i:'-'eziective of
c irc,:1.- tance s.
it was one of the r les fi.st

established in

sidering cont,'acts in restraint of trade,

con-

that the'! were

to be lookeu upon as prima facie bad, but in Kousillon
v.

ILousillon this i',le seems to have bern aisrega_,ed,

and within certain limits the buraen of showing that the
contract was invalid on the ground of restraint of trade
was thrown upon the doefnuant.
And in Leal v. Chase, Judge Christiancy, in speakin-r,
of the objections urged in _itchell v. Reynlas, viz.:
First.

They tend to prevent competition jhich the pub-

lic interests favor; and
Second.

They aeprive the state of the services of a

citizen by binding him to ialeness or

emigration; says;

"As to the first ground, it may be said it is quite true
the public are interested in competion in business;
but this is not true unaor all circumstance nor t- every
extent.

The pul-lic is quite as much inerested in the

propsi'erity of its citizens in their various avocations
as it can possibly be in their competition.

The latter

may bring low prices to purchasers, but may also bring
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them so low that capital becomes unprofitable and business men fail to the great injury of the comniunity.
The doci-ion in

"

itchell v. RUeynolus is then quoted from

to show that even at that tirie the evils of .inrestricted
competition were recognized, and that it may or may not
have been beneficial under different. circumstances.
Then the Judge says:

"And it may well be asked,

who in general are the best judges of these circumstance*,
the parties concerned, who have an interest in making them
the subject of their contracts, or the courts, who can
obtain of the circumstances only such partial and unsatisfactory views as conflictin
can give ther.

and imperfect evidence

As to the second ground it must be con-

ceded that the state has always an interest that none
of its citizens shall be kept in enforced idleness.
But when a contract only binus a person not to engage
in a particular business within the state, is this consequence a necessary oi, even a probable one?

it might

have been so in Eng:land in the days of Chief Justice
Parker when a system of apprenticeship prevailed which
rendered it exceedingly difficult for one to obtain a
living by his industry in any other avocation than that

9
foi- which he had fitted himself by serving his time under its rules and under the law, but in this country
at this time --

where a change of occupation is too com-

mon to excite remark;
turers,

where merc!iants become manufac-

and lawyers farmers, and far'ers traders,

not

because they receive a consideration for doing so, but
because with larger opportunities for observation than
they had at first,

they have rally satisfied themselves

that such changes will be for their advantage, as oftimes
they have proven to be,--- any rule of law which should
assume that one who for a valuable consideration bargains not to follow his previous business, had thereby
bound hiv-self to idleness and penury, wvotld be a rule
absurd in.itself, and contrary to general experience and
observation.

"

1

These quotations show the drift of the recent decisions in treatinF contracts whereby one person is restrained from competing with another.

The tendency in

these cases seems to be towards almost complete freedom
in the making of such contracts, and the old rules that
treated them as prima facie the outcast and pariahs of
the contract world and rendered it exceedingly difficult
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for their Food character, if they had one, to be

proven,

have almost become obsolete.
This tendency,
tations,

arises

as has been said in

of the quo-

frorm the chang s and :.-oaifications

busii-vess inethoas t!,lt
thlese changcs

one

have beeon constantly made,

seei: to continually call

in

and

for more liberty

in the making of contracts of this nature.
Lut while the
thei'

ti'eatinent

,f

courts were growing more
tJse contracts,

lenient

the situation

in

was be-

coming such that some more expeditious and comprehensive
means

of suppressing competition was necessary; and by

the time the rule as to contracts in restraint of trade
had been rel-:-xed to its greatest extent, those wishing
to attain this result had acopteu

other means for the

purpose.
These different

methods of doing away with competi-

tion,,first by individual restraint by contract,
second the various methos

and

,f restraint b,. combination,

were not tried in the order named, but pr_ ctically at the
same time.

ievertheless they seem to present distinct

steps tending in the same airection.
taken .,as by combination.

The next step

To the business man, anxious

to avoil

the fierce rivalry which he must endure,

the

prospect of making allies of his rivals; and working
wit

them to attain successful results and sharing with

all the profits of the entire business, was very alluring,
This fact caused many of tiese combinations to spring
into being.

The first and most simple attempts were in

the form of agreements between sevq)ral parties binding
th mselves to observe certain restrictions in conducting the business they carried on in comnion.

These re-

strictions usually were intended to cotrol prices and the
amount of product.
.'any of these associations were formed,
appeared that they couL

but it

soon

not withstand the attacks made

on them from without, nor survive internal dissensions.
Their own rmembers would break the rules laid down and if
any legal steps were taken to compel obedience to these
rules the courts would, so far fro; enforcing them,
hasten to brand the whole combination as illegal.
The fate of these associations, as well as some of
their objects and restrictions may be.illustrated by the
following cases.
One o.' those most often cited and also one of the
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earliest is hooker v. Vandewater--4 Denio, 34(j-- decided
in 1845.

in this case an agreement between the owners

of five lines of boats doing business
was in question.

on the Erie Canal

E"' this apreement the:,Y entered into

a combination and prescribed one schedule of rates for
fi'eight and passenger;charges, and also provided that the
total proceeds of the business should be divided among
the various lines in certain proportions.

Each of these

lines was to cary freight and passengers at the prices
fixed by the schedule, and to obey all the other restrictions made by the contract.
This agi'eement was held void and illegal under the
provisions of the Revised Statute which made it a misdemeanor for two more persons to conspire together to do
an act injurious to trade

or conmmerce.

The interpretation placed on the agreement was that
since it alia away with competition it created

s-tch a com-

bination as to constitute an act injurious to trade or
cot::nerce, and hence within the provisions of the Revised
Statutes.

The result was to fix 7,ric)s arbitrarily.

The people were deeply interested in having transportation rates subject to competition, and hence any coinbina-
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tion doing away with such competition must be injurious
ani

illegal.

enforcement

2o,

,2ince the

or any relief

contract was illegal, its

asked under it

would be re-

fused.
The case of Staunton v. Allen--5 Lenio, 454-- decided in

1848,

sa'ie result.

dicussed a similar combination with the
This

combination was greater in

extent

and more carefully planned, but the principal details
were much the same as in

hooker v. Vandewater, and the

court followed that decision.
In these cases the court applied a statute in passinp upon the question involved.

In

M.1orris Run Coal

Co. v. Barckley Coal Co.--68 Pa. St. 173-- decided in
1371, the court came to the

same comclusion

basing its

decision on corrnon law principles.
In this
the laws
their

case five coal companies, incorporated under

of Pennsylvania,

business under

agreed to combine

one managment

its in certain proportions.

and place

and divide the prof-

A comnittee was appointed

to manage the business, which committee had power to fix
prices and the proportions which each company should
furnish to the stock of coal,

to be

sold,

and sh-uld

control the sale thereof.

While each company might

soll coal itself, it could only dou so at the paV-e fixed
by the

committee

assigned to it.

and could not

sell

beyond the proportion

The companies bound themselves not to

ship or sell any coal except according to the provisions

of the agreement.

These companies practically

controlled the output of this particular kind of coal
which was extensively used and a necessary article ir
manufacturing.

The coal companies

claimed that the pur-

pose of the combination was to reduce expenses &c.

in

producing and selling coal.
The court declared, that the reason of the combination

was immaterial since the important fact remained

that the combination controlled the output, and madw the
coal bring greater prices than it would if the business
had bee left free and open to competition.
concerned an article of prime necessity.

That it
That its oper-

ation was general in a large region and affected all
wh. used coal.

Any one of these companies might by it-

slef have taken any step tending to increase the price
of its own Eoods, yet all combined could not be permitted
to take similar steps.

There is a potency in numbers

when combined which the law cannot overlook, when injury
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is the consequence of the combination; and such a combination, being wide in its scope and general in its
effect, could only result in injury.

Hence it mutst

be coisidered cont:.ary to public policy and void.
The courts said:

"A contract is criminal whe , it

has a tendency to prejudice the public, ,or to oppress
individuals, by unjustly subjecting them to the power of
the confederates, and giving effect to the purpose,
whether it is extortion or otherwise."
of public polict

So on the ground

,his combination was declar.d illegal.

Still another case is Craft v. 11c Conoughy--79 Ill.,
346-- decided in 1875.

In this case there was an agree-

ment amopg five grain dealers in a town ; which while in
the forn of something in the nature of a partnership,
was really a co, bination to stifle competition and enable the parties, by secret means, to control the price
of grain, cost of storage, and expense of shipment at
this town.

This was a written agreement signed by the

parties, dividing the business into certain proportions
and leaving the control of each man's business in his
own hands, but providing for reports of business done
to a general bookkeeper, and division of the profits in
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proportion to the share of the various parties.

The pri-

ces to be charged were regulated by the combination.
One of the parties to this apre rint died soon after it
was made anu his son, who succeeded to his business, ref.used to recognize it.

Suit was brought to compel the

payment of cert'-in money, belonging. to the combination,
said to have been held by his father; but the court refused

to grant relief.

The grounds of the decision be-

ing tiiat tne contract was for the purpose of stifling
competition, and hence illegal.
in Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co.--68 P. Y.,
558-- aecided in 1877, the question arose out of an
agreement between two
Elmira Coal Co.

coal companies, the Pittston &

and the Butler Coal Co.,

by 4hich the

latter agreed not to ship any coal to Pew York State
except such as it sold to the former company, and by the
terr's of the c,.ntract could only ship 2,000 tons into
this territory in any event.

The

Lutler Company might

sell its coal anywhere except in Pew York as it chose,
and was not obliged to ship any into that stafte, but such
as it aid ship into that state must be subject to the
terms above mentioned.
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This company produced coal larrely in
2:,000 tons per month.

excess of

The purpose of the 'lmira

in this case was to keep out cf the New York

Compan,

'arket all

of the coal of the Butler Company's mines except such
as it coul. control.

Similar agreements had been- made

by the Elmira Company with other coal companies.
The court said:,

"That such a combination was in-

imical t(. the interests of the public ana that all contracts

designed to effect such an end are contrary to

public policy and therefore void.

Every individual deal-

er has the right to use all legitimate efforts to obtain
the best price for his wares.

lut

.e has no right to en-

deavor to artificially enhance prices by suppressiing
or keeping out Of the market the products of others;
and any endeavor which he may make to bring about such
a state of things is contrary to public policy.

If

such agreements or contracts were sustained there would
nothing to prevent the price of articles of necessity
from being raised
rate.

unnaturally and slla at a ruinous

In this case,

if the Butler Company h-ad sold a

certain amount of its coal at a certain rate, or had
sold its whole product, the contract would have been
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good,

:ince the 1-utl,,,r

Comi-,pany had a ripht

to sell

its

goods to the best auvantage even if the vendee intended
to make an

imporoper use of the goods and the vendor

Inew it.

lut

the

if

the vendor did anything to help along

improper purpose he will be held to be particeps

criminis and cannot
present case.

recover the price.

the Elmira Company's market,
subject to

the

The Butler Company made no certain and

definite sale, but simply agreed to keer

be

This was

or if

its coal out of

any came

in

it

was to

the control of the Elmira Company.

Thus,

knowing the illegal nature of the contract and assisting
in its execution, it was a party to it and for coal sold
under it neither the

company nor their assignees could

recover.
In 1880 the case of Salt Co. v. Guthrie--35 Ohio
St.,

666-- was.decided.

Here a voluntary association

of salt

manufacturers

selling

ana tvansporting that.

cles

of association all

the 1:.embers,

was formed for

salt

when packed in

of the company;

the purpose of

cornumocity.

By the arti-

manufactured

or owned by

barrels,

becamne the property

and its committee was authorized to reg-

ulate the price and grade the ,.eof, and also to control
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the manne' and time of receiving salt from the member's.
Each member was prohibited from selling any salt during
the continuance of the association except by retail at
the factory -nd at prices fix'rc

by the company.

In the decision the court said:

",Public policy

unquestionably favors competition in trade to the end
that its commodities may be afforded to the consumer as
cheaply as possible, and is opposed to monopolies which
tend to advance market prices to the injury of the general public."

It also pronounced the clear tendency

of such an agreement as this to be to establish a monopoly and destrot competition in trade, and for that reason on F:rounds of public policy the court refused to enforce the agreenent.
These cases show the dangers which assailed these
combinations, and resulted in their destruction.
received no mercy at the hands of the courts.

They
No matter

how ingenious were the arguments offered in their behalf,
the instant the fact that their tendency was to restrict
the production or enhance the price of any article appeared, the courtwithout stopping to listen any further
pronounced them illegral and refused to have anything to
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do with the af'reev.nts which bound the uifferent parties
composinf- then.
Deprivea of enforcernent by the courts, these agreements became so much waste paper,
f'ree at any time to withdraw,

and any

.-erber was

and mri.ght at the same time

take aleng with him as much of the funds belonging to the
association as miaht have come into his poss-ission, and
be none the worse off.

Or if

there was no dispostion

on the part of any member to take such summary steps,and
even if
ment,

all

were content to remain loyal to the agree-

ueathror any of the ordinary changes which occur

in business,would almost cer-tainly cause some break in
the ranks.

So the greater the extent of the agreernent

and the greater the number included in the combination
the more opportunities were offered for dissension, and
the less the chance of permanent and successful combination.

Since any iiember who withdrew and continued in

the same business at the old rates would be successful
beyond measure unless the others followed his example,
the result was that the whole combination depended upon
the action of any one member; so if one deserted the
rest must follow and the whole thing tumbled like a

house of cards.
On account of these many drawbacks, schemes
sort ceasod to flourish for a timu]e.
which led

of this

But the causes

to them continued to edist and to increase,

and, as a result,

the principle of combination was once

more resorted to.

This seemed necessary as competition

grew sharper and sharper, and the profits gre'I correspondingly less.

But the fate of those agreements

which had already been made and broken made it
that some more substantial
if the result

form of union must be

was to be any more satisfactory.

the modern trust came

apparent
created
Then

into existence.

This word trust in its popular signification is
vastly more comprehensive

than in its legal sense.

Cook in his work on Corporations describes it,

in its

legal sense, as meaning an agreement between many stockholders

in many corporation to place all their stock in

the hands of trustees, and to receive certificates therefor from these trustees.

"The stockholers thereby con-

solodate their interests, and bl:come trust certificate
holders.

The trustees own the stoc4, vote it, elect

officers of the various corporations, control the busi-

ness, receive all the dividends on the stock, and use
1l1 these dividenus to pay dividends on the trust certificates.

The truste )s are periodically elected by

the trust certificate holders."
The popular signification includes any combination
of the prouucers or dealers

in any commodity.

No matter

what the form of agreement which binds the members together,

no matter what the purpose or result, the mere

mention of the fact that such a combination existst at
once entitles that combination to name of Trust, as well
as all the honors and abuse which that name in its popular, sense carries with it.
While,
an old one;

as we have seen, the idea of combination is
the popular agitation against these combi-

nations and their denunciation are recent.

The reason

of this Lei ng, no doubt, the great extent, power, and
wealth, which a few have attained.

The purpose of

their existence, as announced by their enemies, is to increase the price of the articles contolled, and thus extort unroasonably large profits from the purchaser.
When this purpose is persistently called to the attention of the public by those who for somue cause or other
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announce themselves

as enemies

of the trust

and friends

of the people, and the announcement of this purpose is
actually accompanied by an increase in the price of the
particular article, it is natural that

they should be-

come decidedly unpopular.
This unpopularity having become apparent, it speedily found expression in the press and the utterances
of political parties.

Newspapers, anxious to make

r-ood their 6laims as champions of popular, liberty and
the peoples rights, have bristled with editorials fiercely denouncing any and all such combinations;

and having

denounced all those whose existence was known, so zealous were they that they could not stop there, but must needs
uiscover the existence of many mythical trusts,

and

against these imaginary enemies do battle manfully for
the peoples rights.

The two great political parties has-

tened to put the, ,selves on record, and rivaled each
other in their

pledges and promises.

A bitious politi-

cians and alleged statesmen have made trusts the t'?xt
for niany an eloquent address, and have shown that their
existence aas occasioned by the existence of a tariff,
and, with equally convincing logic, that a country en-

joying the blessing of free tirade was

their paradise

Eills have been introduced into various
aies with the intention of makii
trusts

irmpossible,

lefislative bo-

xistence

te

and ,ihich had they become

of so

called

laws would

no doubt have succeeded in this object, ana probably
woula have rendered the existence

of nearly every other

combination or partnei'ship illegal also.
The general consensus of opinion seemed to be
the trust must go.
ihe trust themselves.

Every one seemed to think
Notwithstanding

ity they seemed inclined to reImain;
vain, but to

andI

their

that

except
u popular-

not only to re-

increase in numbers and wealth.

Thev bore

up serenely under the dcnunciation of the press.

They

di,- not appear to care what political parties said about
them.

And, as for the bills

w-ahich when enacted were

to destroy them,,they seemed to have little vitality,
and never made any substantial progress toward the statute book.

At last more practical steps were taken to

bring about their destruction.
and

the latest

The courts were invoked,

struggle between public policy and pri-

vate selfic-hness was instituted.
The

combinations which were now to be assailed

were

those which

were either in the fori of trusts-- using

that word in its leghal sonse-so~ight to carry

out their

An exornple

rations.

ies Company, or, as
Trust.
in

the

o,- else those which

projects

of a trust

un er the form of cor-

was The Suger F efiner-

it was popularly called, the Sugar

The illeFality of this trust has been declared
lower courts

final decision

of this state,

and is

in the Court of Appeals.

now awaitinr
Both the opin-

ion

of Judge Barrett at the Circuit, and of Judge Dan-

iels

at the General Term, ar.

to be found in

54 l1un,

354.

The plan of this trust is described in these opinions.

It appears that

in fonniing it the first step

taken was to incorporate
to become members

such of the concerns which were

and which had before done business as

partnerships or as individuals.
to enable

the

proposed trust

trol all of the concerns.

This was done in order

board to more easilr

con-

The provisions creating this

trust board, and all the other provisions necessary to
the existence

of the enterprise, were described in what

was called the "trust deed.

'

Phis doc..,rent set forth

the various purposes for which the combination was said
to be forned.

These were to promnote

economy and reduce
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cost , to afford protection against unlawful combinations
of labor,

to keep up the

qualitv of refined sugar,

and

generally to promote the interests of the mebers.

All

the stock of all the corporations was transferred
to a board of eleven tiustees.

To represent this stock,

these trustees issueu to the original stockholders what
were called trust certificates.
received these certificates
own corporation ceased.

When the stockholders

their connection with their

Thenceforth the control of all

these corporations was in this board of trustees by
virtue of the fact that they held 2ll of the stock of
each of the corporations.

Thus their power in each case

was as gneat as that which would have been exercised by
the original stockholders.

Only so much of this stock

was parted with by the trustees as was sufficient to
render enoughi men elegible to fill the boards of directors of the various corporations.
named by

the trustees

These boards, being

and under their

urally be subservient to their wishes.
provided that
should be paid
among the

control,

would nat-

The trustdeed

the profits made by the various

concerns

over to the trustees, and by them divided

trust certificate holders.
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The situation under this deed is thus described by
Judg;e Larrett:

"Thus we have a series of corpor-Itions

existing and transactin, business under the forms of law
without real membership or [enuinely qualified directors,--mere abstract figments of statutory creations,-- without life in the contrete or underlying association.
Every share of stock has been practically surrendered
and vital membership resigned. "
The State brought an action to vacate the charter
of The north River Sugar Refining Co.,

one of these

corporations; and in this action the decision of both
the trial Court

and. the Ceneral Term was to the effect

that the stockholders of this company had relinquished
that control'over its management which the law contemplated, and had turned over to the trust board.

That

the corporation in this case could not set up that it
was a separate individual, and that

the acts of the stock-

holders were not its acts, and hence it coulL not be punished or held repponsible for such acts, since the corporation was composed of these stockholders and the act
of the entire bcdy of stockholders would be the acV of
the corporation.

That by this act the corporation ceased
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to exercise

the functions

prescribed

law,

and placed

control of a power which the law never

itself under the

intenued should. control it.
offence arainst

b,

This was held a sufficient

the provisions of the acts under which

the corporation was created to warrant its dissolution.
in addition to

this it was hell that the purposes

for which this as§.gnment of powers was made was one
which was unlawful.
tioned in the
selves,

trust deed and these were innocent in them-

the court

which might

Although certain purposes were men-

could look further for other purposes

exist.

From the facts of this

case

the

court inferred that another purpose existed, which was to
control the product of sugar to an extent injurious to
the public.

The trust

deed contained so many provis-

ions for the absolute control of the various factories
by the trust board that it was reasonable to suppose that
they were to be used, and they could hardly be used with
any other result than the suppression of cmpetition;
"and where that appears to be the fact the association
or whatever else it may called, having for its object
the remoVal of competition aria the advancement

of prices

of necessaries of life, is subject to the condemnation
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of the law by which it is denounced as a criminal enterpi'ise.

"

After citingf

cases the Judge also said that "the

association was created for an unlawful object,

the

anc

aefendant by making itself a party to the association
had renounced and abandoned its own duties, and placed
it interests and affairs under the direction and control
of a board which legally should have no power over it,
anu made itself liable to the judgment (of dissolution)
which had been renderea in this action."
Thus,

this most carefully prepared scheme for the

purpose of restraining competitien was destroyed by the
assertion of the siL.leproposition that public policy
required freedoin of covpetition;
being the creatures of law,

and that corporations,

and restricte,

by law to cer-

tain rights the exercise of which must be according to
and by those to whom the privilege was granted/ coAld

la,',

not turn over the exercise of those rights to others for
purposes opposed to public policy.
Another attempt to avoid competition was the Chicago

Cas

Trust Company.

This was declared illegal

the Supreme Court of Illinois.

(22 N. E. 798)

by
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This company was organized under the
corporation law of Illinois.
vias

general in-

The purposes for which it

incorporated were set forth in the statement,filed

with the Secretar-y of State, as follows;

to make and

sell gas and electricity for lighting purposes, and to
buy and

hold ov sell the capital stock of a ,y gas com-

pany in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois.

This compa-

ny after its incorporation purchased a majority interest

in four gas companies uoing business in Chicago, and

mana.reu them so that the, ceased to compete and acted
as a unit in charging higher prices for gas to all con-

The Gas Trust'Company's right to do this was

sumers.
questioned.
them this

It was claimed that the their charter gave

tright.

The court d cided, that since the only mention of
these powers was in the statement filed with the Secretary of ?tate, they could not be said to have been obtained by the necessary legislative authority.

The

filing of the certificates was only a step in the process

of incorpor-ation provided b- the general law, and

that the charter of

the corporation was the general law

and the various state-.'uents and agreements taken together,
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and that

the provisions

inpg gas,

would by

the terms

of the

control.

law possess all

nec-

But the buVinp of

essary powers for t at purpose.
stock in

law would

were fonJ ' cd for the pui'poses of i- ak-

it

if

This company,

uf the general

other companies .was not such a necessry power,

and would not be acquire,_ under a charter empowering the
company to make gas.

The company cle imed that it was

created for two purposes, making gas, an. buying stock
in ot-hcr companies.

The court expressed soine doubt as

to whether a corporation could be created for two distinct objects;

but, without passing upon that point,

proceeded to examine into the legality of the second
object.
the

The court observed, that unaer this power

company had obtained control of all the gas companies

in Chicago, and could manage them as it sa.- fit by means
of boards of directors of its
of this was
nopoly.

own chosing.

to destroy competition

The

The result

and build up a mo-

only powers that the company could obtain

unaer the general incorporation law were legal powers.
The business of supplying gas was of a public nature,
and companies engaged in this business owe a duty to
the public, and any

nreasonable restraints upon the per-
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formance of such is contrary to public policy.
to prevent

competition and create a monopoly is contra-

ry to public policy .
are saia

Any act

to be,

Unlawful acts of a corporation

not only those malum in

se and malum

prohibitum, but also those which have no right to perform lawfully,

that is

those which are ultra vires.

If contracts and grants which tended to promote monopoly
were void at cormimon law then authority for similar acts
could nt

be obtained by a corporation under a general

incorporation act.
Further it is said that
is shown by 'he

the public policy of a state

provisions of its

Constitution of Illinois in

Constitution,

and the

1870 declared against any

legislation giving exclusive privileges to any person
or corporation.

After the adoption of this Constitu-

tion the public policy of the State was against the granting of any, exclusive privilege.

The incorporation law

was -passed subject to this provision and governed bY it.
It

could

not be expected then,

that a chat-ter would be

granted which would permit the controlling by one corporation of all gas companies which migt be formed,
as many as the corporation chose to control.

or

Hence the

purpose of the corporation could not be lawful, and no
rights permitting the carrying on of this unlawful purpose could be obtained under the incorporation act.
These companies, being
ha.

a duty to perfori

,f a quasi public nature,

towaids

the public and the city.

If this corporation by its control prevented the performance of such duties that also :las an unlawful act.
For these reasons the court declared that the second purpose mentioned in the statement was one
contrary to the public policy of the State of
and suc!

that was
lllinois,

being the case, was a power that could not be

obtained or exercised under the incorporation laws.
Hence the acts of the corporation Were without the protection 0

law and lacked an-, corporate authority.

1y this decision it appears that the purposes for
which a

corporation is

create., must be in

with public policr; rnd that the fact that
prescribed by law for

accordance
the steps

incorporation had been properly

taken, and a corporate franchise secured, does not prevent the purpose for which the corporation was created
from beinf

inluired into.

And if the purposes are found

contrary to public policy then theey will be held to be
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powers which the corporation
in

done

a!,d acts

could never huve possessed,
will be declared

termith

accordance

illegal.
In

the case

of Pichardson vs.

Sup-eme Court of 1,lichipan,

(43 N.

Buhl,

the

decided in

W. 1102) a corpora-

tion intended to control the product of matches ,Vas declared to be one created for an illegal purpose, and
contracts
their

made

said that

The court

refused by the court.

enforcement was

and

forilation -Jere illegal

to furthei- its

the purpose of the company was boldly avowed

to be tu control the manufacture
versal use and necessity.
was to farther

that

of uni-

of an article

This agreement

in

question

Such purpose being contra-

purpose.

ry to public policy an. hostile to the interests of the
peoplp,oughjt
it

to receive

the condemnation

was an unlawful purrose,

made to further

that

and being

purpose was

illegal

of the

courts.

so this agreement
and void,

and

hence relief was denied the plaintiff.
The cases which have been

mentioned were all de-

cided by declaring that any agreement

which tended to

do away with competition was against public policy.
So long' as the purpose

'as

to dispose of only one

rival

the contract was held good, even though it was made
avowedly for the pui-pose

of removing a competitor.

in the two cases of Diamond Match Company vx. Roeber and
Leslie vs. Lorrillard, this was the case, and the court
in

passing upon them used languago which seemed to im-

ply that

competition was not to be considered at

all

times necessary.
'hen the question arises in passing upon the status
of a combination of several parties the view takken seems
to be different.

The mere fact that the combination is

for the purpose of suppressing competition is of itself
sufficient to condemn.

That purpose is at once pro-

nounced illegal without argument or discussion.
legality is taken as an indisputed fact.

Its il-

If this purpose

is discovered to have tcaused the creation of any trust
or combination, or if, while more innocent purposes-are
set forth, the court believes that this was the real purpose, then the trust or combination is at once pronounced
illegal.

it matters not how carefully the plah is

made, nor how elaborately the details are worked out,
this one fact

condemns it; and, without listening to any

argument however profound or technical, the combination
is declared illegal.

in case after case it is said,
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f£'ee the

that so long as competition is
ublic are safe, and until

interests of the

this lim,,it is passed the

parties may do anything the,

chose,

and take any steps

the., wish, to improve their position.

But to pass this

limit is to pass outside the pale of legal protection,
and brave the power of the courts backed by popular hostility;

and in

the conflict that then arises there has

been and can be but one result.
This one principle,that monopolies anu combinations
tending to prouuce monopolies are illegal, is the ground
work of all the laws that have been proposed or enacted
These laws simply re-

for the suppression of trusts.

peat that principle in various forms, extend its application perhaps, and fix penalties for its violation.
This one rule is
down.

the weapon with which trusts are struck

Courts ana legislatures are pledged to use it,

and they will continue in

its

use so long as s-ch seems

to be the demand of popular senti. ent.
Whether trusts or combinations of this nature will
ever becane recofnized as legal institutions depends upon this popular sentiment.

If

it

can be shown that the

objections urged agpainst trusts do not necessarily re-

suit;

if the prejudice of centuries a ,ainst monopoly

can be shown to be groundless unuer modern conaitions;
then trusts
lose their

and combinations

restraining

present unsavory reputation,

nized as legal

institutions.

Lut

if

competition may
and boccme

this end is

recogever

attained it must be through a change of public opinion.
Until that

occurs the courts and legislatures

,heir most resolute opponents.

will be

